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Message from the editors: Farewell to the Presidential Power Blog

Dear readers and friends of the Presidential Power Blog,

After eight great years our project has unfortunately come to an end. Having been started in September 2013 by the late Robert Elgie, it brought together many scholars from a wide range of backgrounds. We owe Robert a deep debt of gratitude not only for the opportunity to share our work through the blog, but for the friendships and connections it helped to create.

During the last eight years the blog published a total of 1,415 blog posts – many of which were cited in academic publications as well as national and international media – and attracted close to half a million hits. We are immensely grateful to our contributors and readers and all others who have helped to make the Presidential Power Blog a success.

The blog will remain online for the time being, although no new content will be posted. We believe that the blog presents a great resource for scholars and are therefore working towards preserving the posts in a searchable archive or repository.

Thank you all once again for your support throughout the years,

Fiona Yap, Sophia Moestrup and Philipp Köker

The assassination of Jovenel Moise and the prospect of stability in Haiti

Post by regular contributor, Dr. Roody Reserve, Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, San Salvador, El Salvador

In the early hours of July 6 to 7, President Jovenel Moise was assassinated at his residence in Pelerin 5, Pétion Ville, Haiti.  The world would come to learn that a group of mercenaries, mostly Colombians, were able to enter unchallenged into the president´s bedroom to kill him and wound his wife. At the time of the writing of this blog, more than 15 days after the shocking killing, Haitian authorities have not publicly identified the masterminds behind the brazen assassination or local accomplices within the police who may have helped the mercenaries. In this blog, I revisit the social and political circumstances that led to the assassination and consider what lies ahead for Haiti in terms of the prospect for political stability, social peace and economic improvements. 

A contested president in the face of an irresponsible opposition

Jovenel Moise came to power in February 2017, following presidential elections where he received 55% of the votes the first round of voting, against a strong opposition who was put up to serve as provisional president, then senator Jocelerme Privert. This unexpected result was achieved against strong pressure from the United States and other countries such as Canada and France, which had opposed the idea of a transitional government that was put in place in order to prevent the party of the then outgoing president, Michel Martelly, from controlling the political space. The electoral results showed that the opposition was far from united, and members of the opposition likely overestimated their own political strength, while underestimating the ability of then candidate Moise´s to convince the citizenry about his dream for the country.

Jovenel Moise was sworn in as constitutional president on February 7, 2017, following his electoral win. From the start, three issues stood out as critical challenges for the new president. In the first place, despite the fact that his electoral results were overwhelming, he won comfortably in the first round, Jovenel confronted from the beginning with a legitimacy deficit. Only 21% of voting age citizens went to the polls. Second, notwithstanding the fact that it was clear that the president could not be accused of electoral manipulations, because the elections were organized by actors from the opposition against which he competed and finally won, it was clear that these sames actors were not willing to evaluate their strategy and behave as a loyal opposition to the government. Third, there was a potential electoral challenge: the electoral law could be interpreted that the president’s term began the year the elections were held and not at the time of the inauguration of the new president, which would raise questions regarding when the five-year term of the presidency ended. Notwithstanding the challenges, Jovenel Moise was inaugurated. Opponents, although weakened for not having popular support, continued to rise against the president and accused him of several crimes and illegal behavior.

Meanwhile, the president did himself no favors by failing to follow through on his campaign promises.

Legislative and municipal elections for senators, members of the lower chamber, mayors and local assemblies that should have taken office in February 2017, were not conducted. In addition, the president illegally revoked the tenure of two members of the Supreme Court of Justice, alleging that they had participated in an attempted coup against him. This rendered the institution inoperational. Not only was the president ruling by decree and making decisions contrary to most organized sectors of society, but he had also decided to organize a referendum to replace the constitution without legal provision to support such a move. Unsurprisingly, he lost many of his early political allies, which consisted of regional political leaders with local political ambitions such as senators or deputies. He also antagonized important economic sectors who had financed his campaign. And, according to reports from local human rights organizations, he promoted the establishment of armed gang members from slum cities around Port-au-Prince in order to counteract the popular demonstrations and mobilizations of the opposition. Poverty, insecurity, and misery mounted in the country.

Going forward

Fast forward to recent months: faced with an acute political crisis and intense international pressure, Jovenel Moise decided to choose a new prime minister in order to inspire some confidence among political actors as well as the institutions. Haiti has a semi-presidential system: semi presidential systems have the advantage of having a configuration of dual executives, with separate heads of state and government, where the former retains a good share of power. Ariel Henry, the designated new Primer Minister, has a reputation as a moderate and have personal relationships with many of actors from the opposition.

In this context of political promises of new beginnings, the president was assassinated. The assassination left the country was adrift, since he died before installing the new prime minister. The existing prime minister, Claude Joseph, took command and began to maneuver to stay in power. The opposition responded in kind, announcing an alliance with the designated Primer Minister Henry, in which he would retain his designation and the president of the remnant of the senate, Joseph Lambert, would act as President of the Republic. International leaders reversed an initial apparent support to Claude Joseph to back Ariel Henry. On July 20, Henry took over as the new Prime Minister with Claude Joseph as his Minister of International Relations.

Jovenel Moise’s death provided no solution to the deeper political problems of mistrust and factionalism. Indeed, the assassination of the president occurs in a context of institutional vacuum that he had created and of which he took clear advantage. Meanwhile, political, social, and economic chaos threatens the country, where the confusing history of unstable alliances such as ones described above is unlikely or even unable to resolve. The days ahead will reveal how far political actors can rise to the challenge of working together for the benefit of the country. They will also tell us to what extent the solution to today’s crisis is a preparation for the next.

Unexpected Turnover: President Samia Suluhu and the Future of CCM

Samia Suluhu Hassan just closed in on her first 100 days in office. Since taking office, Suluhu has moved beyond the most egregious elements of her predecessor John Magufuli. Tanzania has begun publishing Covid-19 data again, civic space has widened, and Suluhu has made calls for more foreign direct investment and fast-tracking of delayed resource extraction projects. 

But, the fact that Suluhu came to the presidency following Magufuli’s unexpected death raises key questions about the future of CCM and its long-standing grasp on power. Indeed, speaking at Magufuli’s funeral, Suluhu found it pertinent to eliminate any doubts that she was indeed the President of Tanzania. To better understand why she felt the need to say that we have to understand the role of succession in authoritarian regimes, and how this practice has evolved within Tanzania’s ruling party, CCM. 

Institutionalized Succession and Authoritarian Politics 

While political conditions worsened under Magufuli, CCM has a long record of using overt and covert manipulation of the electoral process. In academic terms, this makes Tanzania a longstanding electoral authoritarian regime­. But, in contrast with other authoritarian regimes, Tanzania stands out as a case where norms of regular executive succession have repeatedly been respected. The one caveat is that this has all happened within one political party. 

Scholars often examine authoritarian regimes like Tanzania’s through the dilemma of power sharing. Autocrats needs support from other elites, but those elites can also become regime threats. Bare carrots and sticks are often insufficient and ineffective. Therefore, autocrats regularly surround themselves with institutions that constrain and set out clear rules for appropriate elite behavior. Political scientists say that institutions such as ruling parties can smooth inter-elite relationships and therefore stabilize autocracy. 

The gold standard of institutional development in an autocracy is regular executive succession. By rotating the presidency regularly, it forces elites to consider a longer-term game. If you know you can contest the highest seat for office at a future moment in time, you will continue to invest in the regime rather than defect and stake out your own political territory. Moreover, if you know that credible rules were followed in selecting the presidency, you are more likely to commit to the regime even if you lose. Term limits also lower the stakes of incumbency and help ensure that no faction can box out others. Consequently, moments of executive transition are less dramatic than in cases where power has been centralized and personalized for decades. 

But, regular executive succession in an autocracy is rare. The conditions under which an authoritarian regime might constrain themselves and concede to regular turnover are limited. Even if certain rules are put into place, there are always incentives to erode them. This is particularly true as the nature of elite politics shifts. If you can become president without playing by a certain set of rules, why not do so? Of course, those who break the rules might be cutting the legs off of the very system that sustained the regime for so long.  

CCM’s Presidential Succession System

For reasons I explore elsewhere, conditions in Tanzania were suitable for an authoritarian regime that institutionalized presidential succession. The system combines elements that foster competition between candidates, but also provide the regime with a modicum of control over who is an acceptable candidate. 

The fairly minimal candidacy requirements (age, education, a symbolic set of signatures, and a nominal fee) encourage competition. These requirements have not changed much over time, and have made it possible for an increasing number of candidates to contest at each succession juncture. In 1995 there were 17 presidential candidates, while in 2015 there were 42 candidates. 

The party exerts more control during the subsequent selection process. The candidate list is initially vetted by CCM’s Central Committee and whittled down to just five. This is by far the most opaque stage, since the criteria for selection and elimination have not always been clear. In 2013, the party introduced an official national security and ethics committee review, but the criteria are so wide as to give the Central Committee plenty of leeway. It is during this stage that discussions about candidate appropriateness are discussed among a narrow sliver of the party elite (approximately just 30 to 40 people). 

Elements of competition are again possible during the next stages of candidate selection. First, the party’s National Executive Committee conducts a vote via secret ballot that selects three candidates. Then, the National Party Congress, which consists of nearly 2,500 party elites, meets and votes on the final candidate using a majoritarian system. If no candidate obtains 50%+1 of the vote, balloting goes to a second round. During these stages the individual candidates lobby for the position, and often go on nationwide campaign tours to demonstrate their popular support. 

These rules are susceptible to certain informal factors, some more or less legitimate. For instance, party elites can signal their preference for certain candidates. Likewise, CCM’s elders advisory council, which consists of former presidents, vice-presidents and prime ministers, can make non-binding endorsements or rejections of candidates. This kind of elite signaling is considered appropriate in several nomination systems.

By contrast, the system is susceptible to illegitimate influence peddling. In Tanzania this is often referred to as the impact of nefarious elite networking (Mtandao) and financial influence (Mafisadi). Both factors have become more important over time, corresponding with the impact of economic liberalization on the ability of elites to accrue wealth outside of the state.

CCM’s Succession System in Practice – From Mkapa to Magufuli

This succession system has served the regime well, but its conflict with evolving elite incentives has been problematic. In 1995, party elders had a clear preference for Benjamin Mkapa, but could not disregard the fact that Jakaya Kikwete enjoyed considerable support, particularly among youth. Critically, there was uncertainty during the selection process and real competition, which fostered a sense of credibility. Neither candidate could secure a majority in the first round, which led to another month of campaigning. Mkapa edged Kikwete out by just 48 votes. Kikwete took a long-term perspective, and waited until 2005 when he easily won the nomination with Mkapa’s blessing. 

But, with Kikwete’s presidency came much more toleration of influence peddling. To some degree this had already helped Kikwete in 2005. Central to Kikwete’s nomination in 2005 were figures like Edward Lowassa. Lowassa’s network backed Kikwete in 2005 and expected to succeed him in 2015. But, Lowassa’s involvement with headline corruption scandal caused rifts within CCM. Between 2005 and 2015 there was far more overt factionalism within CCM, primarily anchored around elites affiliated with Lowassa (referred to as CCM-Mafisadi) and those aligned with the Parliamentary Speaker Samuel Sitta (referred to as CCM-Safi, meaning clean). 

By 2015, factionalism over candidate financing reached an apex, particularly with Lowassa’s presidential candidacy. It is reported that Lowassa spent millions of dollars to obtain over 750,000 endorsements. Official rules that guided presidential campaigns were routinely violated by at least six candidates (including Lowassa), who had begun to solicit support as early as February 2014. 

What transpired was a reassertion of the primacy of the party over influence peddling. Lowassa, along with all other candidates associated with factionalism or corruption, were rejected by the Central Committee. This left John Magufuli as the unexpected consensus candidate. This was a remarkable turn of events given the informal bargain between sitting president Kikwete and Edward Lowassa. While rejecting Lowassa led to his temporary defection to the opposition, it is likely that by nominating Magufuli CCM actually deterred a significant wave of defection. Hence, once again regular and credible succession served the regime.

Magufuli’s time in office was controversial and overtly authoritarian, but at its core reflected a continued commitment to rehabilitating CCM’s brand. Under Magufuli, CCM made several constitutional changes and Magufuli was not hesitant to leverage the party to discipline wayward members. Former rivals, including Lowassa, were allowed back into the party on his terms. Importantly, Magufuli rejected the idea of serving a third term, signaling his support for the party’s established rules.  

Samia Suluhu and Unexpected Presidential Succession 

Which brings us back to Samia Suluhu. The norm to date has been to allow sitting presidents to enjoy two terms without an internal challenge. But, the conditions that brought Suluhu to power and the evolving nature of CCM’s presidential succession system present key tests. There is undoubtedly a great degree of uncertainty, given that she has been in office for just 100 days.

Critically, Suluhu was the constitutional successor, but she did not emerge from the same selection process as Magufuli. Indeed, Vice-Presidential candidates are selected with considerably more informality, and Suluhu was not Magufuli’s top choice. While she is CCM’s chairwoman and the incumbent, this leaves her vulnerable to a challenge in 2025 on the basis of asserting proper process. 

Suluhu also does not have a natural political constituency, and is a bit of an outsider given her Zanzibari background. She is not a firm part of either the Kikwete or the Magufuli network. There are already signs that Kikwete might have the upper hand in shaping some decision making in the near future. This could expose CCM to the same factional rivalries that plagued the party in 2015. This could also potentially limit the leeway that other process-oriented party elites give her, and open the door for a challenge in 2025. 

On the other hand, her relative independence makes her an ideal candidate for many in CCM. Suluhu brings the added benefit that her own personal style and approach will likely pare back the excesses of the Magufuli era and help rebuild Tanzania’s international image. Thus, even if challengers do emerge in 2025, Suluhu might have the backing of key elements in the party committed to extending the party’s hegemony over its factions, but willing to tolerate Suluhu’s more conciliatory leadership.  

The key question is how does CCM navigate the tensions within its nomination system, which has served the regime so well for decades. There is some degree of “path dependence” here, meaning there are incentives to sustain it from within. But, equally important is how the system has intersected with shifting elite incentives. Magufuli tilted toward repression of factional rivalries, while Suluhu appears to tilt more toward accommodation. That counterbalance might be useful in setting out new parameters of behavior that will stabilize the selection system and foster elite unity that can perpetuate the regime’s hold on power. 

Guest post. Local Government Trust in an Emerging Democracy: Testing local autonomy and decentralization on deepening democracy

This is a guest post by Professor Jaekwon Suh, Professor, Dept. of  Political  Science & Diplomacy, Pusan National  University, based on the published paper, “Decentralisation and government trust in South Korea: Distinguishing local government trust from national government trust“, Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies

Citizens tend to trust the government if they feel that it represents them well and works in their interests. In a new democracy, do local autonomy and decentralization enhance citizens’ trust in local governments? Even in advanced democracies, we suspect that citizens’ trust in local government is just a reflection of their trust in the national government. Unlike in advanced western democracy with a long history of local self-governing, citizens may not distinguish the role of local government from that of the national government in emerging democracies where local autonomy is usually weak. In this situation, citizens’ confidence in local government is no easily separable from that in the national government.

In a recent paper published in Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, we examined whether local autonomy and decentralization have deepened democracy by creating a space for local politics and contributing citizens’ trust in local governments in South Korea (hereafter “Korea”). Since local autonomy and decentralization tend to be considered part of democratization in Korea, the local autonomy system interrupted by the military coup in 1961 was quickly reintroduced 4 years after the democratization in 1987. In addition, as part of the national policy for balanced regional development, President Roh Moo-hyun accelerated decentralization by delegating a large number of national affairs to local governments in 2004. As one of the leading emerging democracies, we expected Korea to provide a better opportunity to examine empirically how local autonomy and decentralization affect citizens’ trust in governments.

Using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) analysis of the first wave of Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) data in 2003 and the fourth wave of ABS data in 2015, we found that the trust function of the local governments correlates with the trust function of the national government in 2003 and then this correlation disappeared in 2015. Put another way, while Korean people did not differentiate local government trust from national government trust in 2003, they came to distinguish local government trust from national government trust 12 years later. On the one hand, we understand this finding as a piece of indirect evidence that local autonomy and decentralization encourage local government trust, which does not merely reflect trust in the national government. On the other hand, in terms of deepening democracy, we interpret that local autonomy and decentralization have had a positive impact by creating a space for local politics and imprinting the existence of local governments on citizens. To draw practical implications from the SUR regression analysis, we discussed the need for the normalization of the National Assembly, the creation of regional political parties, and a reform of the so-called “imperial presidential system” in Korea.

Guest post. Assessing local level Democratization: The case of legislative performance of the Busan Metropolitan Council

This is a guest post by Professor Byung-Jae Lee (Research Professor, Center for Digital Social Science, Yonsei University) , based on the published paper, “Local government performance and democratic consolidation: Explaining ordinance proposal in Busan Metropolitan Council“, Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies

After the democratic transition in 1987, South Korea (re)-introduced many democratic institutions, notably the direct presidential election and Korean Constitutional Court, that have been conducive to democratic consolidation since then. Another critical, but less salient to the outsiders, pillar of democratization was revived after the thirty years of hiatus in 1991: Local Autonomy system. After thirty years of practicing the local autonomy system, the incipient vibrant optimism that the revived institution would be instrumental to consolidating democracy somewhat dwindled, while the advocates have been incessantly claiming that the Korean local autonomy system is moving incrementally with trials and errors, toward a better, deepened democracy.

In a recent paper published in Asian & the Pacific Policy Studies, we investigate the legislative activities of Busan Metropolitan City Council, through the lens of the local level of democracy. It goes without saying that an effective and well-functioning legislative branch is fundamental to representative democracy. Most of the democratization literature are, however, fixated on national (central) politics, and insufficient attention has been paid to the local level of democracy. Using the ordinance proposal records of the BMC Council in 2006 – 2018, we examine the legislative performance of local council members across legislative sessions and analyze whether the local legislature is moving toward democratic consolidation at the local level.

BMC is the second-largest city – next only to Seoul – out of the 17 metropolitan cities in Korea and provides an ideal case for examining democratization at the subnational level. Other than the size, there are other interesting reasons for selecting BMC as our case for analysis. First, the regionalist voting patterns in the Busan–Gyeongnam Area (popularly referred to as the PK or Pusan-Kyeongnam region and includes the metropolitan areas of Busan, Ulsan, and Gyeongnam) remained consistent during the period under study (2006–2018), with national and local political power at the hands of the same party during that time except for the first two years (2006–2008). This provides an added advantage for the empirical test because possible confounding from other variables such as different ruling parties between the two levels of government can be minimized.  Second, the geographic distance between Busan and Seoul— about 325 kilometers—has also led to independent and distinctive political developments in the PK region: for example, public demand for self-government and decentralization was strong in Busan when social movements in favor of self-government began in Korea in 2000.

Using negative binomial regression model and network analysis, we analyzed the ordinances proposed in the BMC in 2006–2018, with the following specific questions: first, can variation in the number of ordinance proposals be explained by the council members’ individual attributes, such as a member’s gender, age, educational background, previous employment, and hometown? Second, are there identifiable network communities within each council? In particular, we ask whether network communities dealing with ordinance proposals led to the institutionalization of representative politics away from narrow personalistic or patronage relations.

Our primary findings as follows. First, council members’ number of proposed ordinances has increased over time, while those by the mayor decreased in the same period. We believe that this suggests an erosion of executive dominance of policymaking in local councils, which is notable given the absence of horizontal and vertical checks and balances in local governments. Second, female and newly elected council members were most active in legislative proposals, in contrast to the legislative record of long-serving incumbents. We think that the results may capture different strategies for office (e.g., re-election versus higher office). At a minimum, the activity suggests efforts by female and newly elected members to demonstrate representation and connectivity to voters. Third, network analysis results show increasingly diverse and multi-centered communities behind ordinance proposals across time. We believe that the results suggest a move from personalistic politics, characterized by a dense concentration on specific individuals, to institutionalized politics.

The introduction of democratic institutions, usually through new constitutional arrangements, generally focuses on establishing formal democracy at the national level and overlooks governance at the subnational level. Popular wisdom may consider local politics secondary to national politics (‘nation fixation’);[1] perhaps optimistically, there is also a belief that democratization of local politics will automatically ensue once democracy is achieved at the national level. We tried to show in this paper by analyzing the BMC’s ordinance proposals that sub-national democracy is not a direct reflection of national-level democracy and that there is a possibility of slow but steady development compared to national-level democracy as far as democratic backsliding does not occur.

[1] See Gibson, Edward L. 2012. Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press

Guest Post: Decentralization, Administrative Capacity, and Citizen Satisfaction in South Korea

This is a guest post by Geiguen Shin, Kookmin University, South Korea and Byong-Kuen Jhee, Chosun University, South Korea, based on their published paper, Better service delivery, more satisfied citizens? The mediating effects of local government management capacity in South Korea, Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies

Like many third-wave democracies, South Korea’s (hereafter, Korea) democracy has successfully consolidated with the establishment of both electoral and civic democracy. In 1988, the Korea National Assembly passed the South Korean Self-Governance Act, initiating a slew of major reforms that transferred political power to local governments. In particular, following reforms in 1994 in favor of decentralization, local governments’ discretion and capacities to improve the quality of public services significantly strengthened. Since then, Korea has continued to delegate substantial political, administrative, and fiscal powers to the subnational governments, all in the spirit that the quality of democracy may be advanced when local democracy is more substantial.

But, are Korean citizens are more satisfied with public services that are provided by more decentralized local governments? Does systematic decentralization lead local citizens to be more satisfied with their local governments’ performance? Theory suggests that decentralization encourages citizens to more actively participate in the evaluation of their local governments using the performance of government officials in neighboring localities as a yardstick, and thereby increasing the incentives for the local agents not only to be more open, trustworthy, and responsive, but also to produce efficient, high quality public services. Are these expectations borne out?

Given the importance of the increased local empowerment for promoting desired public goods, in the published paper, we tested whether the hypothesized advantages of decentralization on public service delivery will still hold when it is applied to citizens’ satisfaction with public services in Korea. Using the Combined Evaluation of Local Government survey data based on 17 top-tier of provincial-level divisions and structural equation modeling with a maximum-likelihood estimator, our results indicate that both fiscal and administrative decentralization do not have a direct impact on public service satisfaction. However, both fiscal and administrative decentralization variables have a positive and significant impact on local government capacity and economic performance.

Contrary to the expectation, the effects of decentralization on citizens’ perception with public services are not mediated by both government capacity as well as economic outcomes, suggesting that decentralized institutions are not necessarily transmitted to citizens’ perception with public services. While the findings support the existing literature that indicate the positive impact of decentralization on government performance and economic outcomes, the results are not supportive to its impact on the provision of public services. Drawing the sample of Korean citizens, we are able to suggest that Korean citizens are pessimistic about the value of decentralized institutions, and thus their hopes regarding public service delivery are not likely to be realized by the level of decentralization. However, these results should not lead us to conclude that democratic progress in Korea is slow and negative. Rather, in the process of democratization, Korean citizens are less supportive to the decentralized governance, and they are not necessarily satisfied with public service delivery following increased decentralization.

Local Politics for democratic quality and depth: Lessons from South Korea

The following excerpts from a published paper in the Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies (open access). Papers from the Special Issue, Why local politics matters for democratic quality and depth: Studies on South Korea, will be blogged here in the next two weeks. We hope you will find them enjoyable and engaging.

Vast literatures debate the causes, consequences, and workings of democracy: a google scholar search reports some 3.6 million studies on democracy; by way of contrast, studies on authoritarianism barely reach 350,000. The expansive scholarly interest and examination may be unsurprising given that democracy remains highly valued across democratic and less-democratic countries. Witness, for instance, responses to the question, “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?” captured in the most recent public opinion survey by the World Values Survey (WVS). Of 125,000 participants in 79 democratic and less-democratic countries in the wave 7 survey conducted between 2017 and 2020, a clear majority of 51 percent responded that it is “absolutely important”, i.e., 10 on the 10-point scale, while a supermajority of over 75 percent of the respondents rank it on the top end of the scale from 8 to 10 (Inglehart et al 2020). Democracy is highly sought after even among respondents in East and Southeast Asia: “even” because their citizens are popularly thought to be willing to trade democratic progress for economic development to allow strong, generally unaccountable governments to pursue economic performance per the East Asian development model (Yap 2019). Thus, the wave 7 survey reports over 39 percent of 18,000 respondents from 11 countries or special autonomous regions in East and Southeast Asia say it is “absolutely important”, i.e., 10 on the 10-point scale, to live in a country that is governed democratically, while 72 percent peg their responses on the top end of the scale from 8 to 10 (Inglehart et al 2020).

Given that democracy is so widely- and highly-prized, and extensively researched, it is curious that studies on sub-national or local democracy constitute a decidedly small number on the topic: a google scholar search yields a mere 64,000 results, or less than 2 percent of total studies on democracy. The marked difference is particularly noteworthy in light of the push for political decentralization since prior to the turn of the century. Political decentralization refers to the devolution of authority from national governments to elected officials at sub-national levels, in the interest of improving government accountability and responsiveness; such accountability or responsiveness is achieved through citizens’ ability to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with elected representatives by throwing them out of office.

The series of papers provided here in the next two weeks add to the limited scholarship on sub-national democracy, to call attention to the need to take account of local democratic institutions and progress in studies of democratic variability or consolidation.[1] In particular, we point out the need to take account of local politics and their consequences in studies of democratic quality and depth. The terms “sub-national” and “local” are used interchangeably in this and other articles in the SpS. There are at least four reasons to study sub-national politics that go beyond the prima facie case that its examination furthers understanding of democratic depth and quality.

First, studies show that “nation fixation”, where focus on democratic advances at the national level supplants interest in local level politics and processes, has enabled “sub-national undemocratic regimes (SURs)” to coexist within a national democratic framework (Gibson 2012; Giraudy 2015).[2] Thus, notwithstanding and contrary to conventional optimism that democracy at the national level trickles down to the local level over time, studies show that democratic national-level politics may co-exist with undemocratic local-level ones due in no small part to the inattention to sub-national experiences. Problematically, events in East and Southeast suggest such SURs. As an example, in the Philippines – where People Power ousted President Ferdinand Marcos from office in 1986 – the 30-year anniversary in 2016 was marked by political resurgence for the Marcoses: wife Imelda was a provincial congress representative in Ilocos Norte, daughter Imee was governor of same province at that time, and son Ferdinand Jr. made a competitive run for the vice presidency in the 2016 elections. Clearly, sub-national politics such as these affect democratic variability and consolidation, in spite of success at the national-level, so that systematic study and evaluation of local politics must complement and complete study of national-level democracy.

Second, local politics and developments are key to political decentralization, which denotes the devolution of authority from national governments to elected officials at sub-national levels. The push for political decentralization increased prior to the turn of the century, aimed at improving government responsibility and responsiveness through citizens’ ability to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with elected representatives by removing them from office (Gelineau and Remmer 2006; Diaz-Serrano and Rodriguez-Pose 2014).[3] Given the political and policy drive for political decentralization, expanding study of political developments at the sub-national level is sine qua non for needed evidence-based support of a major initiative that also sheds light on democratic depth and quality. This may be particularly relevant for East and Southeast Asia, where political decentralization is practiced in a majority of the non-communist, multi-party countries.[4] Thus, local elections are held in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.

Third, local level processes and institutions affect accountability, a critical element of democratic quality (Diamond and Morlino 2004).[5] Accountability comprises vertical and horizontal accountabilities, where vertical accountability refers to the ability to hold governments responsible, usually evident when dissatisfied voters throw their governments out of office, while horizonal accountability characterizes the capacity of other institutions or officials to monitor and check government powers (Diamond and Morlino 2004). Thus, local level governance may capture elements of horizontal accountability, through the capacity to check excesses of national government; and vertical accountability, where voters are able to hold governments responsible for performance at the national and local levels. The extent to which answerability exists at the local level, then, directly affects accountability processes and, consequently, democratic quality and depth in a nation. Government accountability is particularly relevant to East and Southeast Asia, where politicians have asserted the uniqueness of Asia and “Asian values” in order to slow or desist democratic developments (Kim 1994).[6] If and how government accountability is practiced at the local-level, where less attention is directed, promises to be revealing.

Fourth, relatedly, the narrative of exceptionalism through “Asian values” has re-emerged with the resurgence in the East Asian Development Model – where strong, unconstrained governments are credited with directing their economies to success by motivating or compelling their citizens’ cooperation – across less-developed countries in Asia and Africa (Cha and Yap 2000).[7] While “Asian values” may be particular to East and Southeast Asia, this narrative of exceptionalism is used to justify democratic slow-down in developing or less-developed countries where economic growth is prioritized. Yet, as Cha and Yap (2020) point out, systematic evidence to support exceptionalism, even in East and Southeast Asia, is absent. Examination of democratic quality and depth across local and national politics, then, is highly relevant now, when narratives of the “Asian values” and the East Asian development model that have been adopted to stymie developments towards accountability and democracy. And, it may be especially useful for East and Southeast Asia, which are emulated globally.

To draw attention to the need for local level politics and developments in democratic study, the papers focus on local- and national-level politics in South Korea (hereafter abbreviated to Korea). With the single country case, national-level political, social, and economic variances are held constant, so that findings on local-level politics may be broadly generalizable. Korea provides useful study on several grounds. For one, the country was among the original East Asian Tigers, which included Taiwan, Singapore, and Hongkong, and among the first of these tigers to transition from decades of autocratic or military-supported governments to democracy; importantly, despite popular perceptions regarding the East Asian development model, Korea has stayed the democratic course through economic challenges and even as its contemporaries in the Third Wave democracies have struggled with backsliding. As a successful national-level democracy in East and Southeast Asia, it pays to examine the quality and depth of Korea’s democracy, particularly what it means at the national-level and local-ones. For another, Korea has formal devolution of power to the local levels; these formalized processes and institutions at the national- and local-level levels, then, may be juxtaposed to illuminate if and how politics at the two levels co-exist or develop alongside each other to deepen understanding of democratic study. Thus, the Local Autonomy Act was enacted in 1988 in Korea, i.e., immediately following democratic transition, to pave the way for the development of local-level governments; political decentralization followed with elections for local councils and local governments instituted in 1991 and 1995 respectively. And, last but not least, the Candlelight Revolution, 2016-2017 – where million-strong protestors demonstrated in the capital, Seoul, and across cities in Korea against then-president Park Geun-hye led to the first impeachment and ouster from office of a sitting president – brings to fore the considerable might of civil society. Meanwhile, civil society has emerged as a critical driver of democratic transition, progress, and consolidation in the literature. Thus, the magnitude and force of the protests that led to the seismic shifts in Korean politics in at least two instances – constitutional democratization in 1988, and the constitutional removal of a president from office in 2017 – behoove examination of the roles of civil society in local- and national-level politics in Korea and what they mean for democratic accountability and support.

In the following sections, we briefly survey the literature on democratic studies to situate the current calls and responses for new or previously overlooked political factors in studies of democratic quality and depth. We go on to provide overviews of the papers in this SpS that underline how sub-national politics operationalizes in Korea as capacity-building and experiential-training grounds for democratic development, in ways congruent to other factors – namely, civil society – identified as relevant political factors in examination of democratic variability and further consolidation. We conclude with implications of the findings.

REFERENCES

[1] See Fishman (2016) for a discussion of four dimensions of democracy – authenticity, quality, depth, and consolidation – for use in theory-building and empirical assessments. Fishman, R. M. (2016). Rethinking dimensions of democracy for empirical analysis: Authenticity, quality, depth, and consolidation. Annual Review of Political Science, 19(1), 289–309. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurevpolisci‐042114‐015910

[2] Gibson, Edward L. 2012. Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Giraudy, Agustina. 2015. Democrats and autocrats: Pathways of subnational undemocratic regime continuity within democratic countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press

[3] Gelineau, F., & Remmer, K. L. (2006). Political decentralization and electoral accountability: The Argentine experience, 1983–2001. British Journal of Political Science, 36(1), 133–157. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712340600007X;

Diaz‐Serrano, L., & Rodr guez‐Pose, A. (2015). Decentralization and the welfare state: What do citizens perceive? Social Indicators Research, 120(2), 411–435;

Fuchs, Dieter, and Edeltraud Roller. 2018. “Conceptualizing and measuring the quality of democracy: The citizens’ perspective.”  Politics and Governance 6 (1):22-32.

[4] The list of 17 countries in East and Southeast Asia are: China, Mongolia, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Brunei, and Timor-Leste. See Nationsonline https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/about.html

[5] Diamond, L. J., & Morlino, L. (2004). The quality of democracy: An overview. Journal of Democracy, 15(4), 20–31. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2004.0060

[6] Kim, D. J. (1994). Is culture destiny? The myth of Asia’s anti‐democratic values. Foreign Affairs, 73(6), 189–194. https://doi.org/10.2307/20047005

[7] Cha, J., & Yap, O. F. (2020). Challenging the East Asian development model: Evidence from South Korea. The European Journal of Development Research, 32(1), 220–250. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287‐019‐00227‐1

Lithuania: President Nauseda—Half a Year Filled with Confrontations and Conflicts

After the October 2020 parliamentary elections frictions in the country’s political life began to mount rapidly. Once the previously ruling political party coalition (Peasants-Greens and Social Democrats) lost their majority in parliament, and a new Conservative party led tri-party coalition agreement was signed, President Nauseda sought to reposition his office’s role in the newly emerging political constellation. Despite skyrocketing infection rates in the country at the time, Nauseda took time to meet and interview every single ministerial cabinet nominee (he rejected two candidates and then met with two new nominees). Political analysts found such president’s “sticking to the rules” unacceptable and criticized Nauseda’s insistence to use the entire 15-day period allotted to the President by the Constitution to approve and submit the new government members for a parliamentary vote. Political observers noted that none of Nauseda’s predecessors used the entire allotted two-week period nor did his predecessors held interviews with every ministerial candidate. Nauseda’s insistence to stick with the rules under the most pressing circumstances while the country was in the tight grip of Covid-19 with hundreds of deaths happening every day was perceived as a major political misstep and insensitive oversight that, arguably, set the tone for confrontation with the winning Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (HU-LCD) party. 

Once approved, the new government under the Prime Ministership of Ingrida Simonyte—Lithuania’s first female prime minister and a high-ranking member of the HU-LCD party that backed her candidacy in the 2019 presidential elections—began to clash with President Nauseda almost immediately. Initially, the issue of disagreement between the two institutions centered around the acquisition and distribution of vaccines, then turned into disagreement over vaccination process and speed, and, eventually, spilled into confrontation over the representation of Lithuania’s political and public health interests at the EU level. Specifically, Nauseda’s and Simonyte’s offices publicly contended over two questions: first, which office—prime minister’s or president’s—should represent Lithuania at EU meetings on matters of public health and vaccine access/distribution; and, second, an even more contentious matter centered around who should be attending the European Council meetings and whether EU matters fall under foreign affairs or domestic politics domain. 

Nauseda’s office argued that the question of who represents Lithuania at EU summits had been “settled” during President Grybauskaite’s term in office (2009-2019). Given a decade long tradition started under Grybauskaite who had been representing the country and attending all EU summits—although prior to her decade long presidency Lithuania was sometimes represented by prime minister at EU meetings—the presidential office claimed that there was no need to re-think or debate the representation question. Nauseda signaled that as part of President’s Constitutional duties and responsibilities he intended to fulfil his Constitutional obligations by attending every European Council meeting no matter what kind of issues—domestic or foreign policy in nature—appeared on the Council’s agenda. The HU-LCD party leadership, party members (i.e., current European Parliament member and former Prime Minister Kubilius, Lithuanian parliament HU-LCD member Matas Maldeikis and others) and, eventually, Prime Minister Simonyte pushed back, arguing that public health matters are government’s prerogatives in which the President has no constitutionally assgined decision-making powers. Therefore, while attending EU summits and discussing domestic matters, including assuming any commitments, Nauseda would be breaching the Constitutional division of powers—after all, the president cannot commit Lithuania on behalf of the government just like the government cannot assume commitments on behalf of the President. 

Local media enjoyed the brewing political bitterness between the two key political institutions and added fodder to the expanding interinstitutional fire by seeking and publishing remarks of HU-LCD members that took confrontational stands towards Nauseda. After nearly five months of political ping-ponging among the HU-LCD leadership, the Prime Minister Simonyte, and President Nauseda, the Prime Minister had decided to write a letter to the President offering a compromise: “In the past, decisions on who – the president or the prime minister – had to represent Lithuania would be made before a European Council meeting based on what issues had more weigh on the agenda. Perhaps we could return to such discussions.” In essence, Simonyte suggested a return to the pre-Grybauskaite representation model of Lithuania at EU meetings and hoped that “who goes to Brussels” question would be amicably agreed upon between the prime minister’s and president’s offices. 

No political analyst expected that Nauseda would accept Simonyte’s offer. Indeed, in early June the presidential office issued a public response to Prime Minister declining to “share” representation duties at EU level and signaling that only the President would represent Lithuania at EU Council meetings [1]. The President’s office implied that further escalation of this question would be viewed as anti-constitutional and against state’s interests [2]. After Nauseda’s response, Simonyte seemed to have “buried” the issue [3], yet the HU-LCD party members, especially Zygimantas Pavilionis, Chair of the Parliament’s Foreign Policy Committee, and  HU-LCD  MP Matas Maldeikis, seem to be intent on keeping the confrontation with the President in a “to be continued” phase. Both parliamentarians dismissed Nauseda’s response as lacking sound legal and political argumentation and described his answer as an expression of president’s personal “political position.” (Maldeikis even accused the President of “lying.”) Pavilionis suggested that President’s response did not “close the [representation] matter,” and that he planned to pursue a legal route possibly submitting an inquiry with the country’s Constitutional Court if necessary [4]. Meanwhile, Maldeikis’s proposed bill to regulate the country’s representation issue at EU summits has been tabled by the Parliament Chair for the time being, but the parliamentarian has suggested that his bill could be brought up for parliament’s debate at moment’s notice.

In parallel to the ongoing public disagreements between the President and Prime Minister on who should represent Lithuania at EU Council meetings, another friction between Nauseda and the HU-LCD party Chair and current Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis over ambassadorial appointments unexpectedly erupted in late January. Landsbergis had proposed former Foreign Minister Linkevicius and former Defense Minister Karoblis to become ambassadors to the US and the EU, respectively, but to everybody’s surprise Nauseda rejected both ambassadorial nominees on the grounds that the two policymakers needed to go through a political “cooling off” phase. This presidential decision produced a wave of criticism not only from political analysts and political scientists, but also from former ambassadors and even intelligence officials. Nauseda’s decision was described not only as shortsighted because Lithuania had ambassadorial vacancies in two highly important political locations for more than a year, but also shocking due to an unheard-of justification in Lithuania’s ambassadorial rejections that the nominees needed to “cool off.” It took another month for this political controversy to subside as Foreign Minister scrambled to propose another candidate for the ambassadorship to the US, which Nauseda eventually accepted. (Ambassadorial nomination to the EU remains unresolved.) 

The most recent friction between the President and the HU-LCD leadership, namely, Landsbergis and Simonyte, arose last week after the June 24th EU Council meeting during which, among other issues, Hungary’s controversial law that bans the “promotion” of homosexuality to children and young adults and prohibits sex change was discussed. Surprisingly, Nauseda decided not to sign a letter written by 17 EU leaders (among the signatories were Latvian and Estonian Presidents) in which the EU leaders reproached Hungary over LGBTQ rights and pledged to continue fighting against discrimination of the LGBTQ community across the EU. According to the President, he stood up for Hungary because “problems [should not be] solved by letters” and implied that since some EU leaders had not familiarized themselves with the text of the law, they should not take the role of judges [6]. In contradiction to Nauseda’s stand, Prime Minister Simonyte suggested that remarks by the 17 EU leaders expressed in their “very moderate letter” actually “[had] a basis.” Furthermore, President’s backing of Hungary also clashed with the current Foreign Ministry’s position as vice minister of Foreign Affairs Pranckevicius signed another EU letter just a week before that expressed “great concern” over the newly passed Hungarian law.

Mounting disagreements and lack of coordination over domestic and, increasingly, foreign policy issues between key political players clearly risk causing some serious problems down the road. If Nauseda and Landsbergis with Simonyte continue taking opposite stands, then it becomes unclear as to which country’s institutional voice, opinion, and signature truly matters and carries political significance. It is not out of realm of possibility that persistent domestic political frictions could result in an incoherent foreign policy. 

Additionally, an equally unsettling trend that has emerged over the past six months is that tensions and confrontations between the President and the ruling coalition had become a norm rather than an exception. Speculations abound about the motives of each conflicting party as to why they continue to take confrontational stands towards each other. Some analysts suggested that Nauseda by positioning himself as a defender of traditional family values is signaling his determination to run for a second presidential term—recent public opinion polls show that the electorate strongly supports the President and his political stands [6]. Meanwhile, the HU-LCD leadership suffered multiple defeats: Nauseda refused to be arm-wrestled into sharing country’s representation at EU Council meetings with Simonyte; the tri-party ruling coalition had also failed in bringing the Partnership law for discussion in Parliament; and both Prime Minister and the HU-LCD party have experienced continuously declining approval ratings [6]. 

Halfway through the 2021, Lithuania’s political life appears to be filled with little other than political bickering, frictions, and never-ending confrontations. What seems to be certain at this time is that Lithuania is heading into a tension filled and tumultuous political autumn, with the President determined to fight the ruling coalition’s “encroachment” on the presidential office powers and hoping for a guaranteed victory in the 2024 presidential elections.

[1] See https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/prezidentura-sako-kad-abejoniu-del-atstovavimo-evt-nera-simonytei-atsakys-artimiausiomis-dienomis.d?id=87304009

[2] See https://www.lrytas.lt/lietuvosdiena/aktualijos/2021/06/02/news/g-nausedos-atsakyma-i-simonytei-vadina-politiniu-vandeneliu-prezidentas-meluoja-19598886/

[3]See https://www.lrytas.lt/lietuvosdiena/aktualijos/2021/06/03/news/i-simonytes-atsakas-i-g-nausedai-tikrai- nemanau-kad-rasysiu-trecia-laiska-prezidentui-19610528/

[4] See https://www.lrytas.lt/lietuvosdiena/aktualijos/2021/06/02/news/i-simonytei-galiausiai-sulaukus-g-nausedos- laisko-konservatoriai-liko-nepatenkinti-sprendimu-zada-ieskoti-teisiniu-keliu-19593370/

[5] See https://www.baltictimes.com/brussels__lgbtq_reproach_for_hungary__has_a_basis____lithuanian_pm/ and https://www.baltictimes.com/lithuanian_president_stands_up_for_hungary_in_row_over_controversial_lgbtq_law/

[6] See https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/naujausi-reitingai-nausedos-populiarumas-auga-simonytei-prastesne-zinia.d?id=87561463

Zambian Elections: Too hot to handle?

As the time until the polls ticks down, tempers are flaring in Lusaka. Inter-party violence has been rising alongside COVID case numbers as the country’s political parties gear up for the elections scheduled for 12 August 2021.

Levels of inter-party violence have reached such alarming levels that the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) has decided to suspend all campaign activities for fourteen days in four key districts of Lusaka, Namwala, Mpulungu and Nakonde. This comes on the back of the suspension of campaign rallies two weeks ago, which was justified due to rising cases of COVID-19.

Rallies

Campaign rallies are one of the most important aspects of election campaigns, which is why parties invest so much money and time in them. In 2015, UPND leader Hakainde Hichilema attended 125 rallies over the 54-day campaign period, often attending three rallies in three locations each day. This was made possible by the use of three helicopters, allowing senior party officials to crisscross the country at a dizzying speed.

African citizens attend rallies at higher rates than almost anywhere else in the world, as rallies are key sites to learn information about the party, their election campaign and to see musicians, popular personalities and often to receive largesse from parties who are trying to show that they would be good benefactors once in power. An Afrobarometer survey conducted in Zambia in 2017 found that nearly 50% of Zambians attended a campaign rally in the 2016 elections.

Question: Thinking about the last national election, did you: Attend a campaign rally?

Following the banning of rallies, there were concerns that the ban was being used selectively to disadvantage the opposition UPND. The government was travelling across the country using the opening of public projects to campaign for re-election, with events that looked suspiciously like rallies. The British and American embassies have both released statements calling on the authorities to be even-handed in campaigns, not using the ban to disadvantage one side.

To get around the ban, the opposition substituted ‘Roadshows’ for rallies. In previous elections, roadshows have been used between rallies in high density areas to drum up a sense of popularity and excitement about a party. They typically involve convoys of dozens of cars with campaign materials and party activists driving slowly through compounds, playing campaign music and dancing as the cars roll through urban areas.

But these roadshows have attracted massive crowds and have now themselves been banned by ECZ due to the alarming rise of COVID cases across the country. Roadshows can now only be used so long as there is just a single car in the ‘convoy’, and groups of door-to-door canvassers cannot be made up of more than three party members.

The country reported its largest ever daily case increase on Tuesday of 2,690 new cases. This new ban leaves political parties with few other options for in-person campaigns, but to use door-to-door campaigning, a tactic that is difficult and expensive in a country three times the size of the United Kingdom.

Given the difficult and changing circumstances around the elections and the restrictions on campaign activities, it will be crucial that parties are given equal airtime in government media – including adverts and profiles in government newspapers, airtime on public radio and equal access to the state broadcaster, ZNBC. This has not been the case in previous elections, but it is more important than ever in 2021.

Inter-Party Violence

The violence between the two main parties – the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) and opposition United Party for National Development (UPND) – has largely been an urban phenomenon so far. But we know that in 2016, there was some level of violence and intimidation around the country, and we can likely expect the same in 2021 unless political leaders take a strong stance against the use of violence by their members.

Predominantly, it has appeared to be driven by relatively young men (party ‘cadres’) who take it upon themselves to disturb the campaigns of their opponents, by showing up in large groups, often armed with machetes and stones. The incidents appear to be driven by members of the ruling party, but the opposition UPND has also retaliated at times leaving injured young men and damaged property in the wake of campaign events.

These levels of violence are exceptional for Zambia, and early results from several surveys suggest that many voters believe the 2021 elections to be far more violent than those that preceded them.

In order for the elections to be seen as legitimate and fair, it is crucial that action is taken by both parties against actors that perpetrate violence and intimidation. It is also vital that the police are seen to be neutral and non-partisan, taking action to arrest violent elements regardless of political affiliation.  

Suspending the Polls?

On 13 June, President Lungu suggested that he might invoke his powers to call for a state of emergency to address the COVID and campaign violence problems. As quoted in Bloomberg, Lungu said on state TV that “If Electoral Commission of Zambia can’t do their part, if the police can’t do their part, in the constitution — if you read carefully — I have power that I can invoke anytime. Don’t push me against that route.”

But by law, such a decree would need to be approved by legislators. This would be impossible, given that parliament was dissolved a month ago, just before the start of campaigns. A postponement at this point would surely only heighten the temperature in Lusaka and undermine perceptions of the electoral process.

In another worrying development, substantial parts of Lusaka were closed down for four days last week, ahead of Defence Forces Day which saw processions of military personnel and hardware through the capital and a flyover by the airforce. The timing of the procession is widely seen as suspicious, given that it came two months out from the polls and is – according to sources in Lusaka – the first ever ‘annual’ event of its kind.

As the polls approach, it is crucial that all political actors in Zambia work to reduce the temperature around the elections, to re-build trust and to level the playing field. Any further escalation risks doing long-lasting damage to people’s perceptions of the electoral process and denting Zambia’s image as a peaceful, stable and democratic country.

Peru: Fear and Loathing Accompanies Left Turn

At the time of writing, the final outcome of Peru’s bitter, fear-fuelled run-off election is still the subject of intense dispute. Nevertheless, when the dust settles, all available evidence indicates that left-wing outsider Pedro Castillo will be the country’s president-elect. In symbolic terms, this is a hugely significant outcome: Castillo is a rural schoolteacher and union leader from a small-farming background who has set himself against the dominance of Lima-based elites and neoliberal economics. Whether his election translates into profound institutional and policy change, however, remains in doubt.

The official results of the run-off vote saw Castillo claim the narrowest of victories over Keiko Fujimori, perennial candidate and daughter of imprisoned former president Alberto. According to the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE), Castillo received 50.2% of votes to Fujimori’s 49.8% – a margin of around 60,000 votes. In keeping with the times, however, Fujimori has alleged fraud and appealed the outcome, seeking to discard around 200,000 votes. The challenge appears unlikely to succeed in legal terms – to date Fujimori has provided no evidence of large-scale fraud and observers have deemed the elections free and fair – but will certainly set the tone for Castillo’s presidency.

The same could be said for the conduct of the second-round campaign, which was characterised by an even greater level of fear-mongering and polarisation than Peru faced in the 2011 run-off between Fujimori and Ollanta Humala, which Nobel-laureate Mario Vargas Llosa famously likened to a choice between ‘AIDS and cancer’. As political scientist Alberto Vergara has noted, on this occasion both candidates defied political common sense by failing to moderate in the second round.

In the context such a tight election, however, it does appear that Castillo played his hand more skilfully. Firstly, the forging of an electoral alliance with former candidate Veronika Mendoza – who narrowly lost out on a run-off chance in 2016 – not only united key elements of Peru’s notoriously fragmented left, but also brought on board technical know-how to flesh out his initial 12-page programme for government. Secondly, Castillo distanced himself from the founder and other more radical leftist elements of his own Peru Libre party, and vowed to respect democratic institutions.

Finally, there was the febrile anti-political mood that has been building over a number of years in Peru. The impacts of Covid-19 has significantly accelerated this process, as the pandemic has thrown a cold light on Peru’s pro-market, growth-based development model. Peru’s underfunded public health system has been exposed, resulting in the country suffering the worst per capita death rate in the world. Furthermore, its open economy has experienced the sharpest fall in growth (11%) and a rapid rise in unemployment (10%).

As the quintessential political outsider, Castillo was able to take advantage of this situation, as encapsulated with the defining soundbite of an election taking place during the Peru’s bicentenary: “No more poor people in a rich country”.[i]  In response, Castillo’s opponents utilised fiercely negative attacks to reduce his lead in the polls, with media reports full of dire warnings of impending communism, references to Cuba and Venezuela, and to Peru’s own violent past in the shape of the Shining Path terrorist group. In this context Keiko – the daughter of an authoritarian leader imprisoned for human rights abuses – was recast as the saviour of democracy.[ii]

Castillo refused to be drawn in, however, maintaining his focus domestic inequality. In particular, Castillo concentrated on the parts of the country those in Lima call ‘provincias’ – areas that have not only failed to reap many rewards from Peru’s ‘economic miracle’, but indeed have paid many of the socio-environmental costs of a model based primarily on minerals and hydrocarbons. The efficacy of this strategy was reflected by huge proportional victories for Castillo in regions most associated with mining. For example, Castillo received just short of 90% of the vote in the highland region of Puno.

Presuming that he does take office, Castillo will have to overcome significant hurdles if he is to meet the expectations of his followers for significant political and economic changes. Not only will he face dual public health and economic crises, but Castillo will also be confronted by an opposition-dominated Congress, hostile media and a mutinous business community. In that context, it would appear that Castillo’s success in keeping key promises to renegotiate mining contacts and advance some kind of agrarian reform may hinge on the fulfilment of another pledge: to convoke a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution.

Whether Castillo can push through the kind of fundamental institutional reforms that underpinned the projects of leftist presidents like Evo Morales in Bolivia or Rafael Correa in Ecuador, however, is highly questionable.

For starters, Peru lacks a strong, mobilised and united civil society of the kind that existed in those neighbouring countries. While levels of social conflict in Peru are very high, they tend to be fragmented and small in scale. Secondly, Peru’s economy is structurally constrained by a raft of trade agreements and investment treaties. Finally, elite opposition to root-and-branch reforms will be fierce, with some such as Professor Steven Levitsky raising the spectre of a military uprising. In that context, this fear-laded electoral campaign may present only a foretaste of what is to come.

[i] Another example is the powerful political ad put out by the Castillo campaign, based on a poem by Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano called “los nadies” (“the nobodies”).

[ii] According to Vergara, this logic equated to putting democracy into a coma in order to save it.

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